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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
BANKRUPTCY-FAILURE TO OBTAIN DISCHARGE-REs ADUDICATA.-In a
prior proceeding, voluntary bankrupt, owing to the neglect of his attorney
to file petition seasonably, failed to procure a discharge of debts existing at
that date. Attempts are now made to include in petition for discharge,
under a second voluntary proceeding, those obligations provable at the date
of the filing of his first petition. Creditors contend that the prior debts can-
not be re-submitted for discharge. Held, creditors' contention allowed, and
that only those debts incurred since the previous adjudication may be allowed
in petition for discharge. That the bankrupt was innocent himself, and that
the creditors were not prejudiced by failure of petitioner to effect discharge
are immaterial. In re Brislin, William J., D. C., N. D. N. Y.,-Fed. Sup.-,
(Law Week, Jan. 15, 1935).
The instant case accords with the overwhelming weight of federal author-
ity, which has derived, by judicial construction, the rule that failure of a
bankrupt to obtain a discharge within the statutory time limit (11 U.S.C.
32) amounts in effect to a denial of the right to obtain a discharge. Re-
gardless of bankrupt's innocence, the courts hold that there has been a
complete adjudication of the bankrupt's rights, and the result is the same
as if the court had passed upon the permanent impropriety of the petitioner
to enjoy immunity from suit by creditors. Hence, where bankrupt seeks
discharge of debts formerly provable, he is precluded from release on the
same by judicial application of the doctrines of res adjudicata. Cases hold-
ing to this general effect are numerous, the most frequently relied upon
being Kuntz v. Young, (C. C. A. 8, 1904) 131 F. 719; In Re Stone, (D. C.,
Ore, 1909) 172 F. 947; In Re Springer, (D. C., E. D. N. C. 1912) 199 F.
294; In Re Loughan, (C. C. A., 3, 1914) 218 F. 619, and more recently, In
Re Mayer, (D. C., E. D. N. Y. 1933) 4 F. Sup. 203. See also 1 Collier
Bankruptcy (12th ed., 1921) p. 347; 3 Remington Bankruptcy (2nd ed.,
1915) p. 2290.
The application of this severe rule, however, has not been received with
wholly universal acceptance. Occasionally a court of bankruptcy will rebel
against a principle so completely devoid of sympathy for a bankrupt who
has made earnest efforts to secure a discharge but for causes outside of his
control has failed to act within the required time. Hence, some courts have
refused to look upon failure to obtain discharge as res adjudicata where
special mitigating circumstances exist, on the ground that in view of the
inequitable position in which petitioner is placed, negligence attributable
to him is excusable. In Re Whittaker, (D. C., Mont. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 345;
In Re Cotton Co., (D. C., S. D. Tex. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 533. Both of these
cases relied upon an earlier case for authority yet evidently failed to appre-
ciate its true basis. In a well reasoned, simply put decision, it was held
(In Re Glasberg, (C. C. A., 2, 1912) 197 F. 896), that even though his first
petition was dismissed for want of prosecution, and despite the fact that
the statutory time had elapsed for filing, bankrupt might still obtain dis-
charge on those same debts. The court held that a bankrupt, under sec. 17
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of the Bankruptcy Act, was entitled to release from all his provable debts
except in case of six specified classes of obligations. Negligent delay did
not fall within any of the latter class, and since debt was provable, bank-
rupt was able to obtain relief. Res adjudicata was not considered by the
court.
It is submitted that the prevailing law as announced in the principal
case is arbitrary, technical, unfounded on reason or policy. Precluding a
petitioner merely because of delay on the fiction of a judgment determining
his rights has been an expedient way for the courts to dispose of the matter,
without further examination into the nature of the bankruptcy law. The
logic of the case of In Re Glasberg, supra, is unrefutable, for the statute
expressly endows the bankrupt with the benefit of being relieved of all
provable debts, except in certain cases of which delay is not one. At least,
the court can exercise a discretion in granting a discharge in view of a
conflict between Sections 14 and 17 of the Act. That such discretion should,
in the usual case, be resolved in favor of the bankrupt rests upon a consid-
eration of the purposes of bankruptcy legislation. Historically, of course,
the law has been a device to be invoked for the protection of the creditors,
and the idea of a discharge of obligations has been of relatively recent
birth, making its first appearance in the legislation of Congress in 1841.
Once implanted in the operation of the bankruptcy law, this feature has
produced invaluable results, as a means of rehabilitating the luckless.
Further evaluation seems superfluous, in view of the position of the Supreme
Court of the United States where it declared, in Local Loan Co. v. Huni
(1934), 292 U. S. 234, as follows: "One of the primary purposes of the
bankruptcy act is to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive
indebtedness, and to permit him to start afresh, free from the obligations
and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.. .. The various
provisions (of discharge) were adopted in the light of that view and are
to be construed when reasonably possible in harmony with it so as to
effectuate the general purpose and policy of the act." Upon such a mandate,
the courts of bankruptcy should feel impressed with the wisdom of a full
reconsideration of the rule announced in the instant case.
W. C. K. '36.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - POLICE POWER - BILLBOARDS. - The following
amendment became part of the Constitution of Massachusetts in 1918: "Ad-
vertising on public ways, in public places and on private property within
public view may be regulated and restricted by law." Mass. Const. Amend.
Art. 50. Under this provision the legislature conferred on the State Depart-
ment of Public Works general jurisdiction over advertising signs on public
ways "or on private property within public view of any highways, public
park or reservation." Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) C. 93 secs. 29-33. The De-
partment of Public Works issued regulations prohibiting the maintenance of
billboards and other signs for outdoor advertising purposes without a permit
and also prohibiting the issuance of permits for outdoor advertising within
certain distances of public parks, reservations and highways.
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